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ABSTRACT
In information driven MAS, information consumers collect infor-
mation about their environment from various sources such as sen-
sors. However, there is no guarantee that a source will provide the
requested information truthfully and correctly. Even if informa-
tion is provided only by trustworthy sources, it can contain con-
flicts that hamper its usability. In this paper, we propose to exploit
such conflicts to revise trust in information. This requires a reason-
ing mechanism that can accommodate domain constraints, uncer-
tainty, and trust. Our formalism— SDL-Lite— is an extension of a
tractable subset of Description Logics with Dempster-Shafer theory
of evidence. SDL-Lite allows reasoning about uncertain informa-
tion and enables conflict detection. Then, we propose methods for
conflict resolution through trust revision and analyse them through
simulations. We show that the proposed methods allow reasonably
accurate estimations of trust in information in realistic settings.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent Systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is a core feature of many domains in which agents
are expected to operate. In such environments, information sources
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such as sensors provide agents with state information. However,
in the context of a multi-agent system, different sets of sensors
can be controlled by different agents, each with their own capa-
bilities. In order to reason about the state of the environment, an
agent must therefore request potentially noisy, incomplete, or mis-
leading information from potentially untrustworthy agents. By ob-
taining information from multiple sources, the agent can build up
a more accurate view of its environment than by utilising its own
sensors alone. To achieve such a task, the agent needs to reason
about the noisy, incomplete, and misleading information. This pa-
per addresses such a need with a mechanism that can reason about
uncertain information and conflict resolution through trust revision.
Various researchers have examined aspects of this problem —
work in computational trust (e.g. [10]) is intended to allow an agent
to determine which other agents should be asked for information,
while work on information fusion [13] examines how incomplete
and noisy information from different sources should be combined
in order to obtain a true picture of the environment. However, nei-
ther work in isolation considers both sources of uncertainty in the
domain, namely trustworthiness of information sources as well as
incompleteness and vagueness of the provided information.
This paper makes two core contributions: Firstly, we combine
Description Logics (DLs) [1] and Dempster-Shafer theory (DST)
[15] to create a computationally tractable framework for reasoning
about uncertain information obtained from different agents. This
framework enables us to detect conflicts in uncertain information
due to constraints imposed by the domain. It also enables us to
resolve such conflicts. Secondly, we show how trust in uncertain
information can be revised when additional information is received.
We model this problem as an optimisation problem, and propose
heuristics that allow us to identify high quality solutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin by
introducing Description Logics and Dempster-Shafer theory. Sec-
tion 3 describes SDL-Lite, our extension of DL-Lite with subjec-
tive opinions. In Section 4, we concentrate on the problem of how
much trust should be placed in a source of information, and we de-
scribe how conflicting information sources can be made consistent.
We evaluate our approach in Section 5 and discuss it with respect
to the existing work and future research directions in Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 DL-based Ontologies
Due to limited space, we do not provide a full overview of De-
scription Logics (DLs), but rather point the reader to [1]. We note,
however, that even for the smallest propositionally closed DL,ALC
(which only provides class constructors ¬C,C D,C unionsqD, ∃R.C
and ∀R.C), the complexity of logical entailment is EXPTIME. Re-
cently, Calvanese et al. [5] proposed DL-Lite, which can express
most features in UML class diagrams with a low reasoning over-
head (with data complexity AC0). It is for this reason that we base
our model on DL-Litecore (referred to here as DL-Lite, although
there are extensions [3]), and hence provide a brief formalisation to
ground the subsequent presentation of our model.
A DL-Lite knowledge base K = (T ,A) consists of a TBox T
and an ABox A. Axioms of the following forms compose K:
1. class inclusion axioms: B  C ∈ T where B is a basic
class B := A | ∃R | ∃R− and C is a general class C :=
B | ¬B | C1  C2 (where A denotes an named class, R
denotes a named property, and R− is the inverse of R);
2. individual axioms: B(a), R(a,b) ∈ A where a and b are
named individuals.
Description Logics have a well-defined model-theoretic semantics,
which are provided in terms of interpretations. An interpretation I
is a pair (ΔI , ·I), where ΔI is a non-empty set of objects and ·I
is an interpretation function, which maps each class C to a subset
CI ⊆ ΔI and each property R to a subset RI ⊆ ΔI ×ΔI .
Using a trivial normalisation, it is possible to convert class inclu-
sion axioms of the form B1  C1  C2 into a set of simpler class
inclusions of the form B1  Bi or B1  ¬Bj , where B1, Bi,
and Bj are basic concepts [5]. For instance, during normalisation,
B1  B2¬B3 is replaced withB1  B2 and B1  ¬B3. In Ta-
ble 3, we define semantics over a normalised TBox for our variant
of DL-Lite— SDL-Lite.
2.2 Subjective Opinions
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) offers a means to characterise
an agent’s view of the state of world by assigning basic probabil-
ity masses to subsets of truth assignments of propositions in the
logic. In DST, a binomial opinion about a proposition x is rep-
resented by a triple wx = (bx, dx, ux) which is derived from the
basic probability masses assigned to subsets of truth assignments
of the language. In the opinion wx, bx, also denoted by b(wx), is
the belief about x— the summation of the probability masses that
entail x; dx, also denoted by d(wx), is the disbelief about x— the
summation of the probability masses that entail ¬x; and ux, also
denoted by u(wx), is the uncertainty about x— the summation of
the probability masses that neither entail x nor entail ¬x. The con-
straints over the probability mass assignment function require that
bx + dx + ux = 1 and bx, dx, ux ∈ [0, 1]. When a more concise
notation is necessary, we use (bx, dx) instead of (bx, dx, ux), since
ux = 1− bx − dx. The negation over an opinion wx is defined as
¬(bx, dx, ux) = (dx, bx, ux) = (b¬x, d¬x, u¬x) [9].
DEFINITION 1. Let w1 = (b1, d1, u1) and w2 = (b2, d2, u2)
be two opinions about the same proposition. We call w1 a spe-
cialisation of w2 (w1 
 w2) iff b2 ≤ b1 and d2 ≤ d1 (implies
u1 ≤ u2). Similarly, we call w1 a generalisation of w2 (w2 
 w1)
iff b1 ≤ b2 and d1 ≤ d2 (implies u2 ≤ u1).
An agent i’s opinion about a proposition x is denoted by wix =
(bix, d
i
x, u
i
x). This opinion w
i
x may not be directly used by another
agent j. Agent j could have a view of the reliability or competence
of i with respect to x. Shafer [15] proposed a discounting operator
⊗ to normalise the belief and disbelief in wjx based on the degree
of trust j has of i with respect to x: tji . The normalised opinion,
wjx, is computed as (b
i
x × tji , dix × tji ).
The trustworthiness of information sources can be modelled us-
ing Beta probability density functions [10]. A Beta distribution has
Table 1: Information sources and their trustworthiness
Source Definition Evidence Degree of trust
C Local civilian sources (4, 0) 0.83
P Local police sources (10, 3) 0.786
M2 Collaborating military forces (50, 5) 0.89
A Acoustic sensors of M1 (1000, 0) 0.999
Table 2: DL-Lite TBox and opinions about ABox assertions
Initial TBox
BombedRoad  SabotagedRoad
∃roadBombedBy  BombedRoad
SabotagedRoad  ¬Safe  Blocked
Opinions about ABox assertions
Blocked(R):(0.71, 0.09, 0.2)
Safe(R):(0.63, 0.066, 0.304)
BombedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.3, 0.5)
Normalised TBox
BombedRoad  SabotagedRoad
∃roadBombedBy  BombedRoad
SabotagedRoad  ¬Safe
SabotagedRoad  Blocked
two parameters (r + 1, s + 1), where r is the amount of positive
evidence and s is the amount of negative evidence for the trust-
worthiness agent i agent has for agent j. The degree of trust tij
is then computed as the expectation value of the Beta distribution:
tij = (r + 1)/(r + s+ 2).
We now provide a running example used throughout the remain-
der of the paper. Following this, we will present the semantics and
reasoning mechanisms for a language that combines DL-Lite and
DST with the view to offering a model for tractable reasoning with
uncertain information and trust.
2.3 Example Scenario
Consider a region in which insurgents are active and where civil-
ian groups are in need of support. An NGO operating in the region
has identified a safe zone Z and aims to bring relief to the injured in
village V by transporting them to the safe zone. There is only one
road R between Z and V, but there is conflict between groups G1 and
G2 within the region. As part of a multi-national peace effort, M1
and M2 operate within the region, and part of their remit is to pro-
tect and support NGOs. The resources available to M2 include Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). M1 acts as liaison to the NGO, and
has intelligence from the information sources listed in Table 1 along
with models of the trustworthiness of these sources. M1 collects the
following pieces of information from the sources in the area: 1)
M2 informs M1 that R is blocked with opinion (0.8, 0.1, 0.1); 2) P
reports that R is safe with opinion (0.8, 0.1, 0.1); and 3) A reports
an explosion on route R with opinion (0.2, 0.3, 0.5). This intelli-
gence is interpreted by M1 given its degree of trust in the sources
into Table 1. The opinions from information sources are discounted
by the trustworthiness of the sources. For instance, M2’s original
opinion for ‘R is blocked’ is (0.8, 0.1, 0.1), but it is discounted to
(0.71, 0.09, 0.2) using M2’s trustworthiness, i.e., 0.89 (see Table 2
Abox for other discounted opinions).
Having provided an overview of DLs and DST, we now turn to
describing our core contribution — a description logic able to rep-
resent uncertainty in the manner of DST.
3. SUBJECTIVE DL-LITE
We propose Subjective DL-Lite (or SDL-Lite for short), which
extends DL-Litecore with subjective opinion assertions of the form
B:w, where w is an opinion and B is an ABox axiom (i.e., asser-
tion). Each ABox axiom is associated with one opinion. ABox
axioms have the form B(a) or R(a,b), where B is basic class, R
is a property, and a and b are individuals.
3.1 SDL-Lite Semantics
In common with DL-Lite ontologies, the semantics of an ontol-
ogy in SDL-Lite is defined in terms of subjective interpretations.
LetW be the set of all possible subjective binary opinions. A sub-
jective interpretation is a pair I = (ΔI , ·I) where the domain ΔI
Table 3: Semantics of Subjective DL-Lite
Syntax Semantics
 I(o) = (1, 0, 0)
⊥ ⊥I(o) = (0, 1, 0)
∃R b((∃R)I(o1)) ≥ max ∪∀o2
{b(RI (o1, o2))} and
d((∃R)I(o1)) ≤ min ∪∀o2{d(R
I(o1, o2))}
¬B (¬B)I(o) = ¬BI(o)
R− (R−)I(o2, o1) = RI(o1, o2)
B1  B2 ∀o ∈ ΔI , b(BI1 (o)) ≤ b(BI2 (o)) and
d(BI2 (o)) ≤ d(BI1 (o))
B1  ¬B2 ∀o ∈ ΔI , b(BI1 (o)) ≤ d(BI2 (o)) and
b(BI2 (o)) ≤ d(BI1 (o))
B(a):w b(w) ≤ b(BI(aI)) and d(w) ≤ d(BI(aI))
R(a, b):w b(w) ≤ b(RI(aI , bI)) and d(w) ≤ d(RI(aI , bI))
is a non-empty set of objects and ·I is a subjective interpretation
function, which maps:
• an individual a to an element of aI ∈ ΔI ,
• a named class A to a function AI : ΔI → W ,
• a named property R to a function RI : ΔI ×ΔI → W .
To provide a semantics for SDL-Lite, we extend interpretations
of DL-Lite class and property descriptions, and of axioms under
unique name assumption. The semantics are presented in Table 3.
The semantics of ∃R is derived from the rule R(aI , bI) →
∃R(aI),∀bI ∈ ΔI . This rule constrains the minimum belief and
the maximum disbelief that ∃R(aI) can have. For any individuals
a and b, the belief in a having a property R (i.e., ∃R(a)), is not
less than belief in a having the property R with b (i.e., R(a, b)),
and disbelief in ∃R(a) is not more than disbelief in R(a,b).
An ontology provides us with domain constraints in the form of
TBox axioms. For instance, the axiom B1  B2 means that every
instance of class B1 is also an instance of class B2. This trivially
implies ¬B2  ¬B1, i.e., an individual that is not an instance of
B2 cannot be an instance of B1. Therefore, given an individual a,
the axiom B1  B2 implies that our belief in B2(a) cannot be less
than our belief inB1(a) and our disbelief inB2(a) cannot be more
than our disbelief in B1(a). That is, b(BI1 (a
I)) ≤ b(BI2 (aI))
and d(BI2 (a
I)) ≤ d(BI1 (aI)) must hold. Similar constraints also
exist in Table 3 for B1  ¬B2.
DEFINITION 2. An SDL-Lite knowledge base K = (T ,A)
is consistent if and only if it has a model. A model of K is an
interpretation of K that satisfies the constraints in Table 3.
If K is consistent, it can have many models, but one of them is the
most general model with respect to the partial ordering on opin-
ions by Definition 1. In the next section, we describe how to detect
consistency, and how to compute the most general model of a con-
sistent SDL-Lite knowledge base.
3.2 Reasoning with SDL-Lite
The aims of this section are twofold. First, we detail the rea-
soning mechanisms necessary to infer opinions about the world
given an SDL-Lite ontology from the information available to an
agent. Second, we define the conditions under which an SDL-Lite
knowledge base becomes inconsistent, and prove that our reason-
ing mechanism ensures the maintenance of a consistent knowledge-
base under certain conditions.
The TBox T of an SDL-Lite knowledge base contains: (i) pos-
itive inclusions (PIs) in the form B1  B2, where B1 and B2 are
Table 4: SDL-Lite knowledge base derived from Table 2
Normalised and Extended TBox
t1 : BombedRoad  SabotagedRoad
t2 : BombedRoad  ¬Safe
t3 : BombedRoad  Blocked
t4 : SabotagedRoad  ¬Safe
t5 : SabotagedRoad  Blocked
t6 : ∃roadBombedBy  BombedRoad
t7 : ∃roadBombedBy  SabotagedRoad
t8 : ∃roadBombedBy  Blocked
t9 : ∃roadBombedBy  ¬Safe
t10 : Safe  ¬SabotagedRoad
t11 : Safe  ¬BombedRoad
t12 : Safe  ¬∃roadBombedBy
Computed Interpretations
Blocked(R):(0.71, 0.09, 0.2)
Safe(R):(0.63, 0.2, 0.17)
BombedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.63, 0.17)
SabotagedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.63, 0.17)
∃roadBombedBy(R):(0, 0.63, 0.37)
∃roadBombedBy−(G1):(0, 0, 1)
∃roadBombedBy−(G2):(0, 0, 1)
roadBombedBy(R, G1):(0, 0.63, 0.37)
roadBombedBy(R, G2):(0, 0.63, 0.37)
roadBombedBy−(G1, R):(0, 0.63, 0.37)
roadBombedBy−(G2, R):(0, 0.63, 0.37)
basic concepts (being either an atomic or an existential concept);
and (ii) negative inclusions (NIs) of the form B1  ¬B2. In or-
der to reason over an SDL-Lite knowledge base K = (T ,A), we
compute the extended knowledge base K∗ = (T ∗,A∗).
The extended TBox T ∗ is initialised as equivalent to T and ex-
panded by computing all (nontrivial) NIs and PIs between basic
concepts implied by T ∗; i.e. T ∗ is closed with respect to the rules:
• if B1  B2 occurs in T ∗ and either B2  ¬B3 or B3 
¬B2 occurs in T ∗, add B1  ¬B3 to T ∗
• if B1  B2 and B2  B3 occur in T ∗, add B1  B3 to T ∗
We, therefore, extend T in O(n2) steps in the size of T and form
T ∗ that contains all possible inclusions derived from T .
The extended ABox A∗ is initialised as equivalent to A and ex-
panded in O(n) steps in the size of A using the rules:
• if R(a,b):w occurs inA∗, add R−(b,a):w
• for each individual awhere R(a,b1):w1, . . . , R(a,bn):wn
∈ A∗, add a new assertion ∃R(a):w where d(w) = 0 and
b(w) = max({b(w1), . . . ,b(wn)}).
We may now specify how interpretations of classes and roles may
be computed based on the computed T ∗ andA∗. Given a classBn,
T ∗ may contain the following axioms that constrain the interpreta-
tion of an ABox assertion Bn(a):
• B0  Bn, B1  Bn, . . . , Bl  Bn
• Bl+1  ¬Bn, Bl+2  ¬Bn, . . . , Bi  ¬Bn
• Bn  Bi+1, Bn  Bi+2, . . . , Bn  Bj
• Bn  ¬Bj+1, Bn  ¬Bj+2, . . . , Bn  ¬Bk
Given these kinds of axioms, Our aim here is to define appropri-
ate inferences regarding the opinion of some assertion in A∗. Let
wn refer to the opinion related to the ABox assertion Bn(a), i.e.,
Bn(a):wn ∈ A∗. Clearly, if Bn(a) does not appear in A∗ —
representing the case that we have no evidence regarding Bn(a)
— then wn = (0, 0, 1), representing maximal uncertainty regard-
ing Bi(a). We use w′n to refer to the interpretation of Bn(a), i.e.
w′ = BIn(a). The most general opinion w
′′
n that satisfy the con-
straints for w′n is then computed as follows:
w′′n = (max(Sb),max(Sd)) where
Sb = {b(wn), b(w0), b(w1), . . . , b(wl)}
Sd = {d(wn), b(wl+1), b(wl+2), . . . , b(wi),
d(wi+1), d(wi+2), . . . , d(wj),
b(wj+1), b(wj+2), . . . , b(wk)}
(1)
If b(w′′n) + d(w
′′
n) > 1, then there is no opinion satisfying the
constraints defined by the semantics forBn(a); otherwise, we take
w′′n as an interpretation of Bn(a).
Let us explain the interpretations for class assertions through the
scenario in Section 2.3. Table 4 shows the extended TBox for the
scenario. The interpretation of SabotagedRoad(R) is constrained by
TBox axioms t1, t4, t5, t7, and t10 of Table 4. Therefore, given
the ABox in Table 2 and based on Equation 1, the interpretation is
computed as (max({0, 0.2}),max({0, 0.63, 0.09})) = (0.2, 0.63).
The interpretation for Rn(a,b) is constrained by the interpreta-
tions of ∃Rn(a) and ∃R−n (b). LetRn(a,b):w ∈ A and ∃Rn(a):wn
be the ABox assertion added to A∗ while extending A. We know
that b(wn) ≥ b(w) and d(w) ≥ d(wn). Belief in ∃RIn(a) does
not constrain belief in RIn(a,b). However, in a consistent knowl-
edge base, disbelief in RIn(a,b) cannot be lower than disbelief in
∃RIn(a) or ∃R−n I(b). Hence, disbelief in ∃RIn(a) is constrained
by the following TBox axioms in T ∗:
• B1  ¬∃Rn, B2  ¬∃Rn, . . . , Ba−1  ¬∃Rn, Ba  ¬∃Rn
• ∃Rn  Ba+1, ∃Rn  Ba+2, . . . , ∃Rn  Bb−1, ∃Rn  Bb
• ∃Rn  ¬Bb+1, ∃Rn  ¬Bb+2, ...,∃Rn  ¬Bc−1, ∃Rn  ¬Bc
Disbelief in ∃R−n I(b) is constrained by the axioms in T ∗:
• Bc+1  ¬∃R−n , Bc+2  ¬∃R−n , ..., Bd−1  ¬∃R−n , Bd  ¬∃R−n
• ∃R−n  Bd+1, ∃R−n  Bd+2, . . . , ∃R−n  Be−1, ∃R−n  Be
• ∃R−n  ¬Be+1, ∃R−n  ¬Be+2, ...,∃R−n  ¬Bf−1, ∃R−n  ¬Bf
Let wi refer to the opinion related to the ABox assertion for
Bi(a) if 1 ≤ i ≤ c and for Bi(b) if c + 1 ≤ i ≤ f . The
most general opinion w′′ that satisfies the constraints for RIn(a,b)
is computed as follows:
w′′ = (b(w),max(Sd)) where
Sd = {d(w), b(w1), . . . , b(wa), b(wc+1), . . . , b(wd),
d(wa+1), d(wa+2), . . . , d(wb),
d(wd+1), d(wd+2), . . . , d(we),
b(wb+1), b(wb+2), . . . , b(wc),
b(we+1), b(we+2), . . . , b(wf )}
(2)
If b(w′′)+d(w′′) > 1, there is no opinion satisfying the constraints
defined by the semantics for Rn(a,b); otherwise, we take w′′ as
interpretation of Rn(a,b).
Let us now compute the interpretation of roadBombedBy(R, G1 )
in our example scenario. It is constrained by the interpretations of
two other assertions ∃roadBombedBy(R) and ∃roadBombedBy−(G1 ).
The disbelief in the interpretation of ∃roadBombedBy(R) is con-
strained by TBox axioms t6, t7, t8, t9, and t12 of Table 4. We
have opinion assertions only for the assertions Blocked(R), Safe(R),
and BombedRoad(R) in the extended ABox derived from Table 2.
Therefore, based on Equation 2, we compute the interpretation as
(0,max({0, 0.63, 0.3, 0.09})) = (0, 0.63). Table 4 shows the interpre-
tations computed for the scenario using Equations 1 and 2.
The computational complexity of these calculations is O(n) in
the size of T ∗ and A∗. Now, we introduce Theorem 1 , which
defines the conditions necessary and sufficient for inconsistency.
THEOREM 1. An extended SDL-Lite KBK∗ = (T ∗,A∗) with
a coherent T ∗ is inconsistent with respect to the semantics in Ta-
ble 3 if and only if one of the following conditions hold:
1. Given Bm(a):wm, Bn(a):wn ∈ A∗, and Bm  Bn ∈
T ∗, we have b(wm) + d(wn) > 1
2. Given Bm(a):wm, Bn(a):wn ∈ A∗, and Bm  ¬Bn ∈
T ∗, we have b(wm) + b(wn) > 1
Proof: The inconsistency arises if and only if at least one class or
role does not have a valid interpretation satisfying the semantics
in Table 3. Let us first analyse the inconsistencies due to the inter-
pretations of classes. The most general interpretation for Bn(a) is
computed as in Equation 1 and referred to as is w′′n. Let wn be the
opinion for Bn(a) inA∗. If b(w′′n) + d(w′′n) > 1, there is no opin-
ion satisfying the constraints defined by the semantics for Bn(a)
and K∗ is inconsistent. To have b(w′′n) + d(w′′n) > 1, one of the
following conditions must hold based on Equation 1:
• b(w′′n) = b(wn)
– d(w′′n) ∈ {b(wl+1), b(wl+2), . . . , b(wi)}: This implies
that there exists a TBox axiom Bm  ¬Bn with ABox
assertionsBm(a):wm andBn(a):wn such that b(wn)+
b(wm) > 1.
– d(w′′n) ∈ {d(wi+1), d(wi+2), . . . , d(wj)}: This im-
plies that there exists a TBox axiom Bn  Bm with
ABox assertions Bm(a):wm and Bn(a):wn such that
b(wn) + d(wm) > 1.
– d(w′′n) ∈ {b(wj+1), b(wj+2), . . . , b(wk}: This implies
that there exists a TBox axiom Bn  ¬Bm with ABox
assertionsBm(a):wm andBn(a):wn such that b(wn)+
b(wm) > 1.
• b(w′′n) ∈ {b(w0), b(w1), . . . , b(wl)}
– d(w′′n) = d(wn): This implies that there exists a TBox
axiom Bm  Bn with ABox assertions Bm(a):wm
and Bn(a):wn such that b(wm) + d(wn) > 1.
– d(w′′n) ∈ {b(wl+1), b(wl+2), . . . , b(wi)}: This implies
TBox axioms Bx  Bn and By  ¬Bn with ABox
assertions Bx(a):wx and By(a):wy. These TBox ax-
ioms imply that the extended T ∗ contains Bx  ¬By
and b(wx) + b(wy) > 1.
– d(w′′n) ∈ {d(wi+1), d(wi+2), . . . , d(wj)}: This im-
plies TBox axioms Bx  Bn and Bn  By with ABox
assertions Bx(a):wx and By(a):wy. These TBox ax-
ioms imply that T ∗ contains Bx  By and b(wx) +
d(wy) > 1.
– d(w′′n) ∈ {b(wj+1), b(wj+2), . . . , b(wk}: This implies
TBox axioms Bx  Bn and Bn  ¬By with ABox
assertions Bx(a):wx and By(a):wy. These TBox ax-
ioms imply that T ∗ contains Bx  ¬By and b(wx) +
b(wy) > 1.
Now, we look into the interpretations for role axioms to test consis-
tency. The most general interpretation for Rn(a,b) is computed
as in Equation 2 and referred to as w′′. Let w be the opinion for
Rn(a, b) in A∗. If b(w′′) + d(w′′) > 1, there is no opinion satis-
fying the constraints defined by the semantics forRn(a,b) and K∗
is inconsistent. To have b(w′′) + d(w′′) > 1, one of the following
conditions must hold based on Equation 2:
• Bm  ¬∃Rn or Bm  ¬∃R−n and b(wn) + b(wm) > 1 since
b(w) + b(wm) > 1
• ∃Rn  Bm or ∃R−n  Bm and b(wn) + d(wm) > 1 since
b(w) + d(wm) > 1
• ∃Rn  ¬Bm or ∃R−n  ¬Bm and b(wn) + b(wm) > 1 since
b(w) + b(wm) > 1
As shown, in the case of inconsistency, one of the conditions defined
in Theorem 1 must hold. Furthermore, if none of these conditions
holds in K∗, we guarantee that K∗ is consistent. 
In an inconsistent extended SDL-Lite knowledge base K∗ =
(T ∗,A∗), the inconsistencies exist only because of conflicting opin-
ions. Two opinions wm and wn, which are about Bm(a) and
Bn(a) respectively, are in conflict if they satisfy one of the con-
ditions in Theorem 1. We label the portion of wm which conflicts
with wn as cmn, and refer to it as the conflicting portion. If the
conflict is due to the axiom Bm  Bn ∈ T ∗, then the conflict
arises because b(wm) + d(wn) > 1; hence cmn = b(wm) and
cnm = d(wn). On the other hand, if the conflict is due to the axiom
Bm  ¬Bn ∈ T ∗, we have conflict because b(wm)+ b(wn) > 1;
hence cmn = b(wm) and cnm = b(wn). If all conflicts in K∗ are
resolved, then the knowledge base becomes consistent.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that the opinion about a spe-
cific ABox assertions is provided by a single source. When there is
more than one source for an assertion, only one of them is chosen
(e.g. based on their trustworthiness). This will be relaxed in future.
Table 5: Extended ABox for case II
a1 : roadBombedBy(R, G1):(0.67, 0.083, 0.247)
a2 : roadBombedBy
−(G1, R):(0.67, 0.083, 0.247)
a3 : ∃roadBombedBy(R):(0.67, 0.0, 0.33)
a4 : ∃roadBombedBy−(G1):(0.67, 0.0, 0.33)
a5 : Blocked(R):(0.71, 0.09, 0.2)
a6 : Safe(R):(0.63, 0.066, 0.304)
a7 : BombedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.3, 0.5)
Having described SDL-Lite we now examine a novel applica-
tion of the system, describing how evidence from multiple sources
can be reasoned about based on the trust placed in these sources.
4. TRUST-BASED EVIDENCE ANALYSIS
Here we get to the crux of the problem being addressed in this
paper: how can we draw reliable conclusions regarding the state of
the world, given evidence acquired from disparate sources (agents),
about whom we have variable trust? We refer to this process as
trust-based evidence analysis. Our aim is not to offer a new mech-
anism for assessing the trustworthiness of information sources; in
fact, we exploit a widely-studied model [10] for this purpose based
on Beta distributions as described in Section 2.2. The novelty of
this work lies in the use of such models to guide evidence analysis.
4.1 Handling Inconsistencies
SDL-Lite presented in the previous section provides a tractable
means to capture and interpret evidence acquired from other agents.
The fact that we have evidence from multiple agents, however,
means that there are likely to be inconsistencies in the evidence re-
ceived. Thus, given evidence (i.e., opinions) from various sources,
our knowledge-base may not be consistent. This is despite the
use of discounting through DST. Discounting provides us with a
“best-guess” of the reliability of agents based on an aggregation of
our prior experiences with, and other knowledge of them as evi-
dence sources. As with any computational model of trust, the trust
assessments that drive discounting are vulnerable to: lack of ev-
idence about other agents and the effects of whitewashing [2]; a
conflation of the probability of malicious behaviour and lack com-
petence/expertise in the evidence-provider; strategic liars; and col-
lusion among evidence-providers. In our running example, for in-
stance, local police and civilian sources have relatively low trust-
worthiness, not because of any perceived malicious intent but due
to a belief that they lack experience in providing precise informa-
tion. With more evidence, trustworthiness of information sources
may be modelled more accurately, but our challenge is to support
the analysis of evidence given the status quo.
To illustrate this challenge, consider an adaptation of our ex-
ample (case II) in which additional evidence is received from a
third source, agent C, about R: C reports that R was bombed by
G1 with opinion (0.8, 0.1, 0.1). With this additional report, our
ABox contains roadBombedBy(R,G1):(0.67, 0.083, 0.247) after
discounting the opinion with C’s trustworthiness 0.83 listed in Ta-
ble 1 (a1 in Table 5 where the resulting extended ABox is pre-
sented). The extended ABox will now has a conflict between a1
and a6, because 0.67 + 0.63 > 1 and the extended TBox contains
∃roadBombedBy  ¬Safe . Let w1 = (0.63, 0.066, 0.304) and
w2 = (0.67, 0.0, 0.33). The conflicting portions of w1 and w2 are
c12 = 0.63 and c21 = 0.67. Let us refer to the trustworthiness of
the sources of w1 and w2 as t1 and t2 respectively. In our example,
from Table 1, t1 = 0.83 and t2 = 0.786. In order for us to trans-
form our inconsistent knowledge-base into a consistent knowledge-
base, from which we can draw valid conclusions given our seman-
tics, we need to determine additional discounting factors x1 and x2
for opinions w1 and w2 such that 0 ≤ c12.x1 + c21.x2 ≤ 1.
In this paper, we specify this problem as that of finding addi-
tional discounting factors for the belief-mass distributions of pieces
of evidence to make our knowledge-base consistent. In general,
our conflict resolution problem is a tuple 〈C,X〉 where C is the set
of conflicting portions that appear in the extended knowledge base
K∗, and X is a set of additional discounting factors correspond-
ing to C. We require that, in 〈C,X〉, ∀cij ∈ C, ∃cji ∈ C and
∃xi, xj ∈ X . Then, a solution to this problem is an assignment of
values to each xi ∈ X such that
∀cij , cji ∈ C,∀xi, xj ∈ X 0 ≤ cij .xi + cji.xj ≤ 1
There are many heuristic approaches to solving this problem, among
them being to consider only consistent knowledge to draw conclu-
sions from the evidence received; i.e. ∀xi ∈ X , xi = 0. This,
however, could lead to a significant loss of evidence. Here, we ex-
plore a nuber of increasingly refined approaches that guarantee the
generation of a consisitent knowledge-base: trust-based deleting,
trust-based discounting and evidence-based discounting.
4.2 Trust-based deleting
If two opinions w1 and w2 are in conflict, the opinion from the
less trustworthy source is deleted, and if both sources are equally
trustworthy both opinions are deleted. Thus, if the trust we have
in the source of opinion w1 is greater than that of the source of w2
(t1 > t2) then x2 = 0 and x1 = 1, and in the event that t1 = t2 we
assign x1 = x2 = 0. In our example, the local police sources P are
slightly less trustworthy than the local civilian sources C. Hence,
the opinion about Safe(R) is changed to (0, 0, 1) and the conflict is
resolved. This approach, however, neglects the amount of evidence
used to calculate trust, and it does not consider the difference be-
tween trust values (tC = 0.83 ≈ tP = 0.786).
4.3 Trust-based discounting
If two opinions w1 and w2 are in conflict, they are discounted
in proportion to the trustworthiness of their sources. That is, the
additional discounting factor for w1 and w2 is computed using
t1/(c12t1 + c21t2) and t2/(c12t1 + c21t2), respectively, where t1
and t2 are the trustworthiness of the sources of the opinions. In our
example, an additional discount factor of roadBombedBy(R,G1)
is 0.79 and that of Safe(R) is 0.75, since the trustworthiness of C
and P are 0.83 and 0.786, respectively. Therefore, to resolve the
conflict, the original opinion of C about roadBombedBy(R,G1) is
discounted by 0.83 × 0.79 = 0.65 and that of P about Safe(R)
is discounted by 0.786 × 0.75 = 0.59. However, this approach
neglects the amount of evidence used to calculate trust in sources.
4.4 Evidence-based discounting
Within the evidence analysis domain, the information that we
have to work with relates to past experiences with a specific agent
(i.e., information source) k where information received has proven
reliable or unreliable according to some criteria (as would be cap-
tured in any trust assessment model). In other words, the amount of
positive evidence we have for agent k, namely rk, and the amount
of negative evidence for that agent, namely sk. From this evidence,
we calculate trustworthiness of k, denoted as tk described in Sec-
tion 2.2. When we receive opinionwki from k, we discount it by tk
and add the resulting opinion wi to our knowledge base. However,
as explained before, additional discounting by factor xi is required
when wi is in conflict with another opinion in the knowledge base.
Discounting wi by xi implies discounting the original opinion wki
by tk.xi. This corresponds to revising the trustworthiness of wki as
tk.xi by speculating about the trustworthiness of k regarding this
single opinion. That is, even though the trustworthiness of k is tk
based on the existing evidence (rk, sk), it becomes tk.xi for this
specific opinion wki ; so, tkxi effectively becomes the trust in w
k
i .
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
x
1
T
o
ta
l a
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
sp
e
cu
la
tiv
e
 e
vi
d
e
n
ce
Figure 1: Speculative evidence required for case II (κ = 1).
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Figure 2: Speculative evidence required for case III (κ = 1).
Here, we create a metric to measure how much we speculate about
the trustworthiness of k regarding wki .
First, to decrease trust from tk to tk.xi, we need additional neg-
ative evidence, which is called speculative evidence and denoted
as ρi. Our intuition is that it is less likely for a trustworthy agent
to present additional negative speculative evidence than it is for an
untrustworthy agent, and thus the receipt of such evidence should
be tempered by (t¯k)κ. Here, t¯k represents the distrust we have in
agent k; i.e. the likelihood that we will receive additional negative
evidence given our experiences with the source. The calibration
constant κ ≥ 0 enables us to vary the influence that prior experi-
ence has on our prediction that an individual will present negative
evidence in the future. If κ = 0, for example, we assume that all
sources are equally likely to provide negative evidence. Now, using
the Beta distribution formula for trust, we obtain:
tk.xi =
rk + 1
rk + sk + 2
· xi =
rk + 1
sk + rk + 2 + ρi.(t¯k)κ
=
rk + 1
sk + rk + 2 + ρi.(
sk+1
rk+sk+2
)κ
Rearranging this for ρi yields:
ρi =
νi(1− xi)
xi
where νi =
(rk + sk + 2)
κ+1
(sk + 1)κ
(3)
To illustrate this, let us return to case II above in which agent
C reports that road R is bombed by G1. Using Equation 3, we
can compute the total amount of speculative evidence necessary
to discount w1 and w2 by x1 and x2, respectively. If we assume
that c12.x1 + c21.x2 = 1, we have x2 = (1 − c12.x1)/c21.
Then, the total amount of speculative evidence (i.e. ρ1 + ρ2) can
be formulated as a function of single variable x1 by Equation 4,
which is plotted in Figure 1. This function has a minimum at
x1 = 0.5892 in the interval [0, 1] and the corresponding x2 is
0.9607. That is, for a consistent knowledge base, trust in C’s opin-
ion about roadBombedBy(R, G1) should be reduced to 0.489 from
0.83, but the trust in the opinion of P about Safe(R) is reduced only
slightly to 0.755 from 0.786. This reflects the relative level of posi-
tive and negative evidence we have from prior experience from both
parties, and results in a consistent knowledge-based from which we
can draw conclusions.
f(x1) =
ν1(1− x1)
x1
+
ν2(1− (1−c12.x1)c21 )
(1−c12 .x1)
c21
(4)
Table 6: Extended ABox for case III
roadBombedBy(R, G1):(0.67, 0.083, 0.247)
roadBombedBy−(G1, R):(0.67, 0.083, 0.247)
∃roadBombedBy(R):(0.67, 0.0, 0.33)
∃roadBombedBy−(G1):(0.67, 0.0, 0.33)
Blocked(R):(0.71, 0.09, 0.2)
Safe(R):(0.63, 0.066, 0.304)
BombedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.6, 0.2)
SabotagedRoad(R):(0.801, 0, 0.199)
Table 7: After extra discounting for case III (κ = 1)
Extended ABox
roadBombedBy(R, G1):(0.0342, 0.0043)
roadBombedBy−(G1, R):(0.0342, 0.0043)∃roadBombedBy(R):(0.0342, 0)
∃roadBombedBy−(G1):(0.0342, 0)
Blocked(R):(0.71, 0.09)
Safe(R):(0.63, 0.066)
BombedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.6)
SabotagedRoad(R):(0.0304, 0)
Computed Interpretations
Blocked(R):(0.71, 0.09)
Safe(R):(0.63, 0.066)
BombedRoad(R):(0.2, 0.63)
SabotagedRoad(R):(0.0342, 0.63)
∃roadBombedBy(R):(0.0342, 0.63)
∃roadBombedBy−(G1):(0.0342, 0)
∃roadBombedBy−(G2):(0, 0, 1)
roadBombedBy(R, G1):(0.0342, 0.63)
roadBombedBy(R, G2):(0, 0.63)
roadBombedBy−(G1, R):(0.0342, 0.63)
roadBombedBy−(G2, R):(0, 0.63)
Until now, we considered only one conflict between two opin-
ions. When we have multiple conflicts, they may interact in such
a way that resolving one may also affect the resolution of another.
To illustrate this, consider two new intelligence reports (case III):
• A reports a bomb explosion on Rwith opinion (0.2, 0.6, 0.2).
• M2 informs M1 that R is sabotaged with opinion (0.9, 0, 0.1).
The resulting ABox is shown in Table 6 and implies three relevant
conflicts: 0.67+0.63 > 1, 0.67+0.6 > 1, and 0.63+0.801 > 1.
Let us refer to (0.2, 0.6, 0.2) and (0.801, 0, 0.199) as w3 and w4,
respectively. We refer to the conflicting portions as c31 = 0.6 and
c42 = 0.801. We also use x3 and x4 to refer to the additional
discounting necessary for w3 and w4, respectively, to resolve the
conflicts. The overall amount of speculative evidence necessary to
resolve all of these relevant conflicts is computed as in Equation 5.
f(x1) =
ν1(1− x1)
x1
+
ν2(1 − x2)
x2
+
ν3(1 − x3)
x3
+
ν4(1 − x4)
x4
such that 0 ≤ c12.x1 + c21.x2 ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ c13.x1 + c31.x3 ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ c24.x2 + c42.x4 ≤ 1 (5)
Since these conflicts are relevant, we can write x2, x3 and x4 in
terms of x1 if we set c12x1 + c21x2 = 1, c13x1 + c31x3 = 1, and
c24x2 + c42x4 = 1. The resulting function is shown in Figure 2
and has a minimum at x1 = 0.0514 in the interval [0, 1]. The
other discounting factors are computed as x2 = 1, x3 = 1, and
x4 = 0.043 in the same interval. That is, trust in the opinion of C
about roadBombedBy(R,G1) is reduced to 0.0427 and trust in the
opinion of M about SabotagedRoad (R) is reduced to 0.0338. The
ABox and the computed interpretations after extra discounting is
shown in Table 7.
We generalise this approach for any number of conflicts with
arbitrary relations. Assume we have a set of conflicting opinions
{〈wi, wj〉, . . . , 〈wm, wn〉} and, derived from trust evidence about
agents, coefficients {νi, νj , . . . , νm, νn}. To determine the opti-
mum discounting factors {xi, xj , . . . , xm, xn} for these opinions,
we construct the following optimisation problem with a multivari-
ate non-linear objective function and linear constraints.
argmin−→x
f(−→x ) where
f(〈xi, xj , . . . , xm, xn〉) =
νi(1− xi)
xi
+
νj(1 − xj)
xj
+ . . .
νm(1− xm)
xm
+
νn(1− xn)
xn
such that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, . . .
and 0 ≤ cijxi + cjixj ≤ 1, . . . (6)
Existing constrained non-linear programming methods can be
used to solve this problem in order to estimate the best discount-
ing factors. There are various techniques that may be used includ-
ing Interior-Point and Active-Set algorithms. In this work, we use
Interior-Point approximation. Details of these methods are out of
the scope of this paper and can be found elsewhere [14].
In this section we have formalised the problem of computing ad-
ditional discounting factors for opinions received about the world
from other agent so that we may formulate a consistent SDL-Lite
knowledge-base from which we can draw reliable conclusions. We
have presented a number of approaches to the resolutions of incon-
sistencies between opinions including an optimisation-based ap-
proach, evidence-based discounting. Next, we evaluate these ap-
proaches with respect to their robustness in the face of liars.
5. EVALUATION
We have evaluated our approach through a set of simulations. In
each simulation, we define the domain by randomly generating an
SDL-Lite TBox that contains 100 concepts and roles, as well as
axioms over those, e.g., B1  B2 and B2  ¬∃R3. For each role
or concept, there is one information source that provides opinions
about its instances, e.g., B1(a):(0.8, 0, 0.2) andR3(a, b):(0.5, 0.1, 0.4).
There are 10 information sources in total, each is an expert on 10
concepts and roles, and provides its opinions about those.
In our simulations, we assume there is one information consumer
that uses the information from sources to make decisions. Each
simulation is composed of 10 iterations. At each iteration t, the
consumer needs to gather information about an individual a. We
generate ground truth about a, which is composed of one assertion
about a for each concept and role with an associated opinion. Each
information source knows the ground truth only about the concepts
and roles of their expertise. However, they may not provide the
ground truth to the consumer when it is requested. Behaviours of
the information sources are determined by their behavioural type,
which are summarised as follows.
• Honest: Most of the time, this type of sources provide the
ground truth about the assertion of their expertise with small
Gaussian noiseN(0, 0.01). With probability Pb, honest sources
behave like malicious ones and provide bogus information.
• Malicious: This type of sources aim at misleading the infor-
mation consumer by providing bogus opinions. More specif-
ically, given (b, d, _) is the ground truth about an assertion, a
malicious source provides the opinion (abs(1), 0.9 + 2, _)
if b ≈ d; otherwise it provides the opinion (d+1, b+2, _),
where 1, 2 ∈ [−0.05, 0.05]. There are two types of mali-
cious sources, which are defined as follows:
i. Simple liars: they always provide bogus opinions.
ii. Strategic liars: they behave like honest sources to build
trust and then provides bogus information exploiting
the built trust. After providing misleading informa-
tion to the consumer, they change their identity to avoid
negative evidence against them.
After collecting opinions about different assertions from informa-
tion sources, the information consumer uses its trust in these sources
to discount these opinions and uses the proposed reasoning mech-
anisms for SDL-Lite to compute interpretations. Ideally, these
interpretations should be close to the ground truth if all sources are
accurate and their trustworthiness is modelled correctly. If there
are some malicious sources, there may be conflicts in the collected
information. In the case of conflicts, the consumer resolve the con-
flicts using Naive Deleting (NDL), Trust-based Deleting (TDL),
Trust-based Discounting (TDC), or Evidence-based Discounting
(EDC) with κ = 1. In NDL, all conflicting opinions are deleted
from the knowledge base to resolve the conflicts. The consumer
computes the interpretations for concept and role assertions related
to a, after resolving the conflicts if any. Then, we measure the
performance as the mean absolute error in the computed interpre-
tations. Let (b, d, u) be the ground truth and (b′, d′, u′) be the com-
puted interpretation for assertion B(a), then the absolute error in
the interpretation is computed as errB(a) = abs(δb) + abs(δd),
where δb = b′ − b and δd = d′ − d. For instance, if the ground
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
M
ea
n 
ab
so
lu
te
 e
rr
or
Iteration
 
 
???????????
Figure 3: Simple liars (Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0)
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Figure 4: Simple liars (Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1)
truth about B(a) is (0.9, 0.05, 0.05), but the computed interpretation
is (0.05, 0.9, 0.05), then the error would be 1.7.
At the end of each iteration, the consumer learns the ground truth
and updates the trustworthiness of the information sources with
new evidence (rt, st) computed as in Equation 7, which is based
on the intuition that the information is still useful if it has a small
amount of noise or is slightly discounted.
(rt, st) =
{
(0, 1), if δb > 0.1 or δd > 0.1
(1, 0), if−0.1 ≤ δb ≤ 0.01 and−0.1 ≤ δd ≤ 0.01
(0, 0), otherwise.
(7)
Each of our simulations are repeated 10 times and our results are
significant based on t-test with a confidence interval of 0.95.
Without any evidence, the trustworthiness of sources is com-
puted as 0.5. Thus, there are is no conflict in the beginning of our
simulations. If all sources have deterministic behaviours, i.e., ma-
licious sources are simple liars and Pb = 0, then trustworthiness of
sources are easily modelled over time and the opinions from liars
are significantly discounted. In such settings, conflicts are totally
avoided and information consumers using either of the four pro-
posed methods have the same level of success. Figure 3 shows an
example of this setting where honest sources always provides the
truth (Pb = 0) and malicious sources are simple liars. Here, the
ratio of liars (Rliar) is 0.5, i.e., half of the sources are malicious.
When honest sources provide bogus information occasionally,
the conflicts may arise in the knowledge base of the consumer, be-
cause the information from these sources are not significantly dis-
counted. Figure 4 shows our results forRliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1,
where all malicious sources are simple liars. In this setting, NDL
leads to significant errors in the computed interpretations. While
TDL does much better than NDL, it is outperformed by discount-
ing based approaches TDC and EDC. Both of these approaches
have similarly good performance though TDC does slightly better.
Simple liars may not be enough to model malicious sources in
real life. That is why we change the type of malicious sources
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Figure 6: Strategic liars with varying Rliar (Pb = 0.1)
to strategic liars and repeat our simulations. Figure 5 shows our
results for Rliar = 0.5 and Pb = 0.1. In this settings, trust eval-
uations become misleading, since strategic liars build trust, make
their impact and then change their identity to avoid any negative ev-
idence. As a result, as shown in the figure, TDC fails significantly
more than EDC after a few iterations. We repeat the simulations
with strategic liars for different Rliar values; our results are shown
in Figure 6. Our results indicate that evidence-based discounting is
much more robust in the presence of realistic malicious behaviour
than trust-based discounting or deletion.
6. DISCUSSION
DL-Lite is a tractable subset of DLs with a large number of ap-
plication areas [4]. Its scalability makes it very useful especially for
the settings where large amount of data should be queried. How-
ever, in a network of heterogeneous sources, any information pro-
vided by the sources could be uncertain, incomplete, and even con-
flicting. DL-Lite cannot accommodate such information. Pan et
al. [11] proposed a framework of tractable query answering algo-
rithms for a family of fuzzy query languages over large fuzzy DL-
Lite [16] ontologies. On the other hand, DST and its extensions
such as Subjective Logic explicitly takes into account uncertainty
and belief ownership [9].
Gobeck and Halaschek [8] present a belief revision algorithm for
OWL-DL, which is based on trust degrees to remove conflicting
statements from a knowledge base. However, as the authors point
out, the proposed algorithm is not guaranteed to be optimal. In our
work, we embed statement retraction implicitly into the opinion
revision procedure with a global optimal criteria which is grounded
on a Beta distribution formalisation of trust.
Fact-finding algorithms aim to identify the truth given conflict-
ing claims. Pasternack and Roth [12] propose to translate these
claims to a linear program, which is solved to obtain belief scores
over claims. For example, with TruthFinder [17], the belief scores
obtained can be interpreted as the result of simultaneously min-
imising the frustration coming from the sources against the claims.
These approaches do not consider semantics while reasoning about
belief and trustworthiness as we do here.
Costa Periera and Tettamanzi [6] deal with belief changes in an
agent’s mental state considering trust in information sources. Dong
et al. [7] propose to resolve conflicts in information from multi-
ple sources by a voting mechanism. Double counting in votes is
avoided by taking into account information dependence among the
sources. The dependence is derived from Bayesian analysis over
data sets held by the sources with a statistical interpretation.
In this paper, we propose SDL-Lite, which is expressive enough
to represent and reason about uncertain information using trust and
domain knowledge. It allows us to efficiently identify conflicting
information with respect to domain constraints. Then, these con-
flicts are resolved through the methods we propose for trust revi-
sion. Through simulations, we show that our approach can success-
fully handle highly misleading information in challenging settings.
The simulations also show that the approach is robust in the face of
strategic liars. In this paper, mostly for clarity, we assume opinions
about each assertion is provided by a single information source. In
the future, we will extend our approach to handle multiple sources.
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